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Abstract
Online auctions have undergone rapid development in recent years. New features of online
auctions, together with new bidding strategies different from those used in offline auctions,
make research in this area compelling. The existing research mainly focuses on the description
of bidding strategies; only a handful of studies focus on the antecedents of bidding strategies.
This research aims to fill this gap by constructing a contingency framework to investigate why
bidders bid differently in online auctions, and use unique bidding strategies. Environmental
factors, bidding tasks, bidders’ characteristics, and bidding motivations are included in the
framework. We conducted in-depth interviews with professional, experienced bidders in China
to reveal the specific reasons why bidders adopt different bidding strategies during online
auctions. Finally, we discuss the implications for both global research and practice.
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Introduction
Online auctions have seen rapid growth and
successful development since the advent of
eBay in 1995 (Stern & Stafford, 2006). As a
result, Amazon.com and Yahoo.com have
also begun boosting their businesses
through the use of online auctions. Several
domestic online auction websites have
emerged and are prospering in different
countries, especially in mainland China. The
Chinese people, who have little experience
in offline auctions, have widely accepted the
online auctions offered by Taobao.com,
which
dominates
the
consumer-toconsumer (C2C) electronic markets in
China (Quaddus & Achjari, 2005).
Park and Bradlow (2005) have given
increasing attention to consumers’ online
bidding behavior, in which the realm of
online auction bidding strategies has
emerged as one of the most prominent
topics. Researchers have found that bidders
usually bid in certain patterns, which has
given rise to the bidding strategy concept.
This concept can be depicted in terms of
when, how, how much, and how many times
bidders submit their bids (Bapna, Goes,
Gupta, & Jin, 2004). Bidding strategies play
a pivotal role in online auctions, as they may
lead to different outcomes for bidders and
sellers (Bapna et al., 2004).
Although there are some descriptions of
bidding strategies in the literature, there is a
lack of systematic research that investigates
the antecedents of bidding strategies.
Bidding is more complex than simple
purchasing because the price is not fixed in
auctions and people need to examine the
current price, the bid increment, and the
bidding behavior of other bidders during the
bidding process. There are many studies in
management information systems and
marketing that have investigated the
antecedents of purchasing (Chan, 2001;
Devaraj, Fan, & Kohli, 2002; Hong & Cho,
2011; Tsiotsou, 2006; Wang, Yu, & Wei,
2012). However, the reason why bidders
choose different bidding strategies largely
remains unclear to both the auctioneers and

researchers. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate the antecedents of bidding
strategy in online auctions. Furthermore,
most of the literature discussed is Western
in origin, and there are few examples of
Asian studies in this area. Thus, there is a
need to bridge the gap between previous
studies under Western cultures and those in
mainland China.
There are several bidding strategies that
can be used in online auctions. Because the
selection of different bidding strategies is a
decision-making
process,
we
use
contingency theory. Contingency theory has
been an important approach to the study of
organizations
and
decision
making
(Elgharbawy & Abdel-Kader, 2013; Kumar &
Subramaniam,
1997).
Assuming
contingency theory holds in this context, it
would say there is no universally
appropriate bidding strategy that is
applicable to all situations. The choice of
online bidding strategies therefore is
contingent upon internal and external
factors. Our study therefore leverages a
contingency perspective to address this
opportunity
by
constructing
a
comprehensive framework that reveals the
antecedents of online auction bidding
strategies in China.
Twenty-one in-depth interviews were
conducted to identify each factor in the
framework (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such a
framework can help both researchers and
practitioners to understand more about the
underlying factors that bidders use in
choosing their bidding strategies. The
framework also provides a guideline for
future researchers in this line of research.

Literature Review and proposal
for a preliminary framework
Online Bidding Strategies
A number of studies of online bidding
strategies have used value, bidding time,
and occurrence of bids as proxies to
differentiate online bidding strategies. In
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reviewing the literature, we have identified
five major types of bidders: (1) evaluators
(early or middle), (2) participators, (3) agent
bidders, (4) opportunists, and (5) “sip-anddippers” (Bapna, Goes, & Gupta, 2000,
2001, 2003b; Bapna et al., 2004). By
understanding the conceptual difference
between these types of bidders, one can
deduce
their
corresponding
bidding
strategies.

ratchet bidding (or nibbling), as each bid is
increased by minimal bid increments (Brint,
2003; Chang, 2012; Friesner, Bozman, &
McPherson, 2008). This kind of bidding
strategy is commonly used in both offline
and online auctions. Friesner et al. (2008)
explain that nibbling is a technique to
deduce the auction value in online auctions
when the value has a high level of
uncertainty.

Bidding Strategy of Evaluators: Jump
Bidding

Bidding Strategy of
Agent Bidding

Evaluators are bidders who usually bid only
once, either during the early or middle stage
of an auction (Bapna et al., 2004). They are
termed such because they are believed to
“evaluate” the product being auctioned
through their sole bid. Evaluators usually bid
higher than is necessary. They bid at a price
that is higher than the current one, plus the
minimal bid increment. Easley and Tenorio
(2004) call this strategy jump bidding. It can
provide
an
opportunity
for
some
inexperienced bidders to evaluate a
product’s price, and is even occasionally
adopted by experienced bidders (Borle,
Boatwright, & Kadane, 2006). Bidders can
use this strategy to signal to their rivals that
they have strong interest and bidding ability
(Avery, 1998; Bapna et al., 2004; Robert F.
Easley & Tenorio, 2004). Although there
may be several “jumps” in one auction,
usually the first jump is greater than the
others (Raviv, 2008), making the evaluator’s
jumping strategy more notable.

Agent bidders are those who employ online
bidding agents in submitting their bids
(Bapna et al., 2004). A bidding agent
actually is a form of automatic bidding
software (usually embedded in online
bidding systems) that can help a bidder to
offer bids at the minimal level needed to
outbid others. This series of bids will
continue until the bid is raised to the
bidder’s desired pre-set maximum price.
Some researchers highly recommend agent
bidding due to its efficiency and competitive
advantage over other bidders (Puro, Teich,
Wallenius, & Wallenius, 2011; Trevathan &
Read, 2011).

Bidding Strategy of
Ratchet Bidding/Nibbling

Participators:

Participators submit their bids by following
the other bids and increasing the price by
minimal bid increments 1 (Bapna et al.,
2004). They behave in this manner
regardless of which stage the auctions are
in. Participators’ bidding strategy is called

1

A minimal bid increment is the minimal amount of
money the next bidder can add to the current price.
For example, if the current price is $5 and the
minimal bid increment $2 in one auction, the next
bidder must bid at least $7.

Agent

Bidders:

Bidding Strategy of Opportunists: Snipe
Bidding
Opportunists are late bidders who wait until
an auction is about to end before bidding
(Bapna et al., 2004). By bidding only near
the end of an auction, opportunists can
avoid a price war and can outdo their rival
bidders by leaving them no time to respond
(Namazi & Schadschneider, 2006). This
approach by opportunistic late bidders is
generally referred to as snipe bidding (Borle
et al., 2006; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002).
Researchers have found that later bidders
are more likely to win their auctions, and at
a lower price (Gonul & Leszczyc, 2011), and
that snipe bidding is the most popular
bidding strategy (Cui & Lai, 2013).
Bidding Strategy of “Sip-and-Dippers”:
Bid Early, Wait, then Snipe
Finally, sip-and-dippers are those who bid in
the early stage of an auction, wait in the
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middle stage, and then bid again near the
end of the auction (Bapna et al., 2004).
These bidders usually are seen in multi-unit
auctions, which provide more than one unit
of a product. As illustration, one seller
provides 10 units of identical hats to be
auctioned, which are priced starting from
$10, with the minimal bid increment of $5.
At the end of the auction, bidder A bid at
$30 for 8 units. Bidder B also bid at $30 for
2 units and bidder C bid at $35 for 2 units.
The final auction price will be the lowest
winning price of $30. Because C bid the
highest, he/she can receive the first 2 units
at $30 (although he/she bid at $35).
Between A and B, the one who entered
earlier in the auction can received the time
priority and be served first. If A entered
earlier in the auction, he/she can receive the
remaining 8 units and B will received
nothing. If B entered the auction earlier,
he/she can receive 2 units, with only 6 units
remaining for A. Therefore, bidders in multiunit auctions sometimes need to bid early to
receive the time priority to outbid those who
have submitted the same bidding price. This
type of bidder actually adopts another
variant of snipe bidding that involves one
more bid during the early stage to keep time
priority in multi-unit auctions.

Antecedents of Bidding Strategies
In this section, we start to build our
framework by finding antecedents of bidding
strategies found in our review of the
literature. We categorize these antecedents
in terms of bidding mechanisms, product
categories, bidder characteristics, and
bidder motivation.
Bidding Mechanisms
In this study, we define bidding mechanism
as all the parameters, functions and
protocols provided by sellers. In a study
using the simulation method, Bapna et al.
(2003b) found that an auction’s starting
prices and bid increments influence bidding
strategies. Roth and Ockenfels (2002),
meanwhile, found that the ending rules of
online auctions influence the adoption of
snipe bidding. In particular, the hard close

(where the auction ends at a certain time)
as compared to the soft close (where the
auction ends if there are no more bids
submitted) will see an increase in the use of
snipe bidding, because sniping is more
effective in hard-close auctions (Dang, Hu,
& Liu, 2015). According to Wintr (2008)’s
study of eBay, late bidding is a strategic
response to ratchet bidding: experts who
desire to keep their willingness to pay
privately usually bid late.
The specific environmental factors that we
include in our framework include both
website factors and auction environment
factors. Online auction intermediaries
provide online bidding agents, which is the
technology most relevant to the online
bidding environment. The effectiveness of
the agents is associated with their
application. Thus, according to the
technology acceptance model, the more
effective an online bidding agent is
perceived to be, the more likely the agent
will be deployed (Davis, 1989). This leads to
increases in the adoption of the agent
bidding strategy. In addition to online
bidding agents, the perceived effectiveness
of some technological services, such as a
host site’s feedback mechanisms and its
escrow service, needs to be investigated.
Primarily, Pavlou and Gefen (2004) have
found that the effectiveness of feedback
mechanisms and escrow services are
important in the online marketplace. In other
studies, researchers have found that
reference price also affects online bidding
behavior (Amyx & Luehlfing, 2006; Kamins,
Dreze, & Folkes, 2004). Because search
engines in online auctions can help
consumers to compare product prices from
different sellers, the effectiveness of
different search engines will also be
investigated in the framework.
Specific factors of the auction environment
provided by the sellers include auction
starting price, auction bid increments, and,
in some websites, different ending rules.
Researchers have found that bid increments
do have some positive influence on active
participation (Bapna et al., 2003b). Low bid
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increments will increase the auctioneer’s
revenue, but will reduce the revenue as it
increases to a certain high level (Bapna et
al., 2001; Bapna, Goes, & Gupta, 2003a;
Bapna et al., 2003b). Researchers have
observed that the starting price has some
influence on online bidding behavior,
including what the final price will be, the
number of bids entered, and access to the
auction (Ariely & Simonson, 2003; Brint,
2003; Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003;
Mcdonald & Slawson, 2002). We thus
propose that these two factors—bid
increment and starting price—likely affect
the online bidders’ bidding strategies.
An online auction’s ending rule (hard close
or soft close) is another factor that we found
in the literature. Most studies found that
hard-close auctions yield lower revenue
compared to soft-close auctions, particularly
when the item’s value is low (Onur & Tomak,
2006). A controlled field experiment,
meanwhile, found that these ending rules
can directly affect bidding strategy, since
different ending rules will generate different
degrees of the adoption of snipe-bidding
(Ariely, Ockenfels, & Roth, 2005).
The final environmental factor in auctions to
be studied is provided by other bidders who
are participating in a single auction. The
bids by others may cause a “herding effect,”
wherein more bidders will bid when there
have been more bids submitted or posted in
online auctions (Ariely & Simonson, 2003;
Kauffman & Wood, 2006; Ku, Malhotra, &
Murnighan, 2005; Stern & Stafford, 2006).
This herding effect will be further
investigated in this research.
Product Categories
Researchers have also found that
consumers exhibit different behaviors when
buying different categories of products
(Wilcox, 2000). Other researchers also
found that different product categories
would generate different levels of ratchetand snipe-bidding adoption (Borle et al.,
2006). de Figueiredo (2000) characterized
e-commerce products into four categories:
commodity products (such as oil and paper

clips), quasi-commodity products (such as
books and compact discs), “look and feel”
products (such as shoes and suits), and
“look and feel” products with variable quality
(such as art). To further simplify this
classification system and to stress the
effects of different bidding strategies, we
chose two extremes for this classification in
this study, commodities and collectibles,
which have different levels of uniqueness as
well as uncertainties in their true value.
Friesner et al. (2008) explain that different
product uniqueness and uncertainty of the
product value in auctions will cause bidders
to behave differently. Their study confirmed
that products with a commonly known value
will increase the occurrence of sniping. We
therefore propose that bidding for
commodities (such as clothes or decorative
goods), or collectibles (such as artwork) can
explain some of the differences in the
bidding strategies adopted in online
auctions.
Bidder Consumer Behavior
Beach and Mitchell (1978) found that
individuals’ personal characteristics, such
as their knowledge, ability, and motivation,
are important factors in determining which
decision-making strategy or strategies they
will employ. In our study, bidders were also
heterogeneous, with various experiences
and motivations in online auctions. We tried
to determine which factors in bidders’
consumer behavior may affect their bidding
strategies. We categorize these in terms of
bidder
characteristics
and
bidding
motivations, described below.
Bidder characteristics. Researchers have
found that experience is one important
factor related to strategic bidding (Borle et
al., 2006; Wilcox, 2000) and auction-bidding
success (Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003). One
study found that bidder experience is
negatively related to herd behavior (Friesner
et al., 2008), while another study found that
bidder experience is positively related to the
use of sniping tools (Bapna, Jank, &
Shmueli, 2008).
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The bidders’ characteristics in our study
also include other important factors from the
literature on online auctions. Risk aversion
is identified as one of the bidders’
preference among different types of
auctions in the study by Ivanova-Stenzel
and Salmon (2008) of. In addition, Bapna et
al. (2004) discuss how a bidder’s risk
preference and value placed on time
savings may influence his or her bidding
strategies. We will investigate these two
factors in our study, as well.
Bidding motivations. Researchers found that
motivations play important roles in the
decision-making process of the elaboration
likelihood model of persuasion (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). Green and Swets (1966)
also found that motivations had effects on
judgment in the signal detection theory.
Motivations are therefore crucial factors in
decision-making, including the selection of
an online bidding strategy. A bidding
strategy selection is not only a decisionmaking process, but also a behavior that is
usually driven by a number of motivations.
Motivation factors therefore should be
emphasized in the current research due to
their importance in both the decision-making
and motivation-behavior research areas.
The framework’s motivational factors were
drawn predominantly from the existing
literature. Researchers have focused on
hedonic motivation (Arnold & Reynolds,
2003; Chiu, Wang, Fang, & Huang, 2014;
Lowry, Gaskin, Twyman, Hammer, &
Roberts, 2013) and utilitarian motivation
(Babin, Darden, & Griffin, 1994; Chiu et al.,
2014; Kim, 2006; Lowry et al., 2013) as two
major categories of motivations in online
interactions. Researchers have found that
joy, a form of hedonic motivation, is
important in systems interactions (Lowry et
al., 2013; Venkatesh, 1999). Other studies
have found that consumers have two
primary utilitarian motivations in online
auctions: to obtain the auctioned item and to
save money (Cameron & Galloway, 2005).
In addition to these two factors, saving time
will also be investigated as a utilitarian

motivation, because time is another form of
cost in modern life (e.g., “time is money”).

Proposing a Preliminary Contingency
Framework for Online Bidding
Strategies
Contingency theory argues that corporation
management
or
decision-making
is
contingent upon both the internal and
external situations of the company or the
decision-making process (Luthans, 1973;
Luthans & Stewart, 1977). In our context,
the selection of different bidding strategies
in online auctions is a decision-making
process. Again, if contingency theory holds
in a bidding context, there is no universally
appropriate bidding strategy that is
applicable to all situations. The choice of
online bidding strategies therefore is
contingent upon external and internal
factors. Therefore, this research aims to
propose a contingency framework to offer a
better understanding of the antecedents of
bidding strategies in different contexts.
In the framework we developed based on
our review of the previous literature, these
factors are categorized into bidding
mechanisms, product categories, and
bidder consumer behavior, as indicated in
Figure 1. The external environment is one of
the early and important contextual factors
that have been examined at the foundation
of contingency-based research (AbdelKader & Luther, 2008; Elgharbawy & AbdelKader, 2013). In our study, bidding
mechanisms, including website factors and
auction factors, are the manifestation of
environmental factors. In addition, for the
internal factors, the choice of decision
strategy
is
contingent
upon
the
characteristics of the decision maker (e.g.,
knowledge, ability, motivation) and the
characteristics of the decision task (e.g.,
complexity,
ambiguity)
(Kumar
&
Subramaniam, 1997). In our study, the
characteristics of the decision maker that
we focused include bidding characteristics
and motivation. Product categories can be
viewed as a manifestation of the
characteristics of the decision task (Solberg,
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2008).

Figure 1 - A Preliminary Contingency Framework for Online Bidding Strategies

Research Methodology
In order to explore the antecedents of online
bidding strategies in the framework, we
conducted
in-depth
semi-structured
interviews that aimed to acquire rich and
detailed information (Carson, Gilmore,
Gronhaug, & Perry, 2001) from online
bidders. Semi-structured interviews help to
investigate bidders’ attitudes in greater
depth. These types of interviews enabled us
to seek both clarification and elaboration of
the answers given to us, which led to a
deeper understanding of the interviewees’
selection of bidding strategies. We followed
best practices for minimizing bias by predetermining our questions and basing them
on our theoretical framework (Ghauri,
Grø nhaug, & Kristianslund, 1995; Jayaratne
& Stewart, 1991). We generally asked these
questions in an open-ended format,
however, which provided the flexibility to
facilitate variation in the questions we asked.
This approach also gave respondents the

freedom to answer as they desired
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Mias, 1996). This
method also allowed us to probe beyond the
answers given, to encourage respondents
to give more detailed answers, to clarify
answers, and to encourage interviewees to
talk at length about their bidding patterns
and antecedents relevant to this research.
The questions used in this study were
prepared according to the structure of the
contingency framework (see the Appendix),
based on the following categories: bidding
strategies, bidding mechanisms, product
categories,
and
bidders’
consuming
behavior. Finally, we asked demographybased questions, which we used to
determine whether demographic factors
might have influenced the interviewees’
decision-making on bidding strategies.

Sampling
We used convenience sampling to recruit
experienced online bidders in China. We
included only the bidders who had been
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successful in bidding in at least ten separate
auctions in the study. This purposeful
sampling allowed us to avoid respondents
who were amateurs or who had little
experience
in
online
bidding.
The
respondents therefore easily understood our
questions and were able to describe the
decision-making processes they used to
choose bidding strategies during the
interview. This can also guarantee that the
respondents were familiar with online
auctions and could easily understand
bidding strategies and other concepts. This
can also help to establish the validity and
reliability of the measures used in this
qualitative research. With experienced
interviewees, we can collect data not only
on their current bidding strategies, but also
on their past bidding behavior, through
which we examine the bidding strategy
changes. Furthermore, it also allows us to
receive more information spanning products
and auctions because of their experience in
the online auction world.

Data Collection
We conducted the semi-structured interview
as follows. First, we invited an expert on
qualitative interviews to examine and
comment on the questions; a steering
committee assisted in the design and
administration of the interview protocol.
Second, during the pilot test, we invited
several bidders, separate from the
interviewees of this research study, to check
the questions to ensure that they were all
understandable to professional Chinese
online bidders. The authors made a few
modifications based on the bidders’
suggestions. We conducted a pilot
communication between the interviewer and
each interviewee candidate to ensure
cooperation with the interviewers. This
process also helped the two parties to build
a good relationship, which enhances the
credibility of an interview (Mitchell, 1983).
We conducted one-hour online interviews
with each interviewee. Again following
Mitchell (1983), a single interviewer who
was highly trained in this research
methodology conducted all of the interviews

in this study; this reduced the interviewees’
bias that can result from inconsistencies in
approach taken by different interviewers.
We conducted the interviews online, via text
chatting. The interviewees especially
appreciated this approach to interviewing
because, as professional online bidders,
this was their preferred means of
communication in their daily work, and was
something they were comfortable doing.
This method had the added advantage of
allowing us to record the content
simultaneously while we conducted the
interviews. The use of the chatting message
history helps in reducing transcription errors.

Data Analysis
We analyzed the data via content analysis,
using two steps. We used this approach to
reduce information overload threats, which
may negatively influence research quality
because
of
the
stimulus
overload
experienced by the researchers. We
analyzed
the
primary
content
simultaneously with the data collection after
each interview, as suggested by Mitchell
(1983). Specifically, each interview was
entirely transcribed and analyzed before
conducting the next interview. We broke the
data of each interview into discrete parts
according to the contingency framework. To
explore the effects of the antecedents on
bidding strategy, we analyzed the data first
vertically along each interview and then
horizontally to allow comparison with each
other. In addition, to properly analyze
qualitative data from our semi-structured
interviews,
we
followed
leading
methodological guidelines set out by Allen,
Poteet, and Burroughs (1997) and Lee
(1999), as follows: (1) inspect the transcript
text and identify themes that are similar,
then group them together; (2) name each
group that represents themes within the
group; (3) categorize the text, and then
cross-check the categories with the second
party and the authors of the paper, to
increase reliability; (4) categorize the
themes and match the text with the themes;
(5) collapse the data across similar themes
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to reduce the number of themes; and (6)
when the themes have been finalized,
collapse or cluster the themes into
meaningful and higher-order factors. As a
result, we successfully conducted and
analyzed a total of twenty-one interviews.

Results
This
section
initially
reports
the
respondents’ profiles in this study. We
subsequently apply the content analysis and
results to the contingency framework. We
summarize and present the results in a
table for each part. Based on these results,
we then create a parsimonious model of
online bidding strategy adoption.

Respondent Profiles
A total of 21 in-depth interviews were
conducted. The sample comprised seven
male and fourteen female respondents. All
of the interviewed bidders had participated
successfully in a minimum of ten auctions;
most had participated in many more. Six of
the 21 bidders (one third) had participated in
more than one bidding website. The
websites ranged from international websites
such as Yahoo, eBay, and Amazon to
Chinese sites such as Taobao 2. Notably,
some of these websites have both
traditional
fixed-pricing
purchasing
capabilities (e.g., one may purchase books
online at a fixed price, without bidding) and
dynamic-pricing auctions; our research
focused only on dynamic-pricing auctions.
Table 1 summarizes our respondents’
profiles.

Table 1 - Profiles of Professional Online Bidders from the Interviews
Interviewee ID

Gender

Successful auctions

Auction website(s)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

F
M
F
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
M

50–100
50–100
10–20
20–50
20–50
>100
20–50
>100
50–100
10–20
>100
>100
>100
50–100
>100
20–50
20–50
20–50
20–50
10–20
50–100

Taobao and Yahoo
eBay and Yahoo
Taobao
Taobao
eBay and Taobao
eBay and Taobao
Amazon, eBay, and Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
eBay, Taobao and Yahoo
Taobao
Taobao
eBay and Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao
Taobao

2

Taobao.com is a domestic website in China that has developed dramatically in recent years; it has become the
biggest electronic marketplace in mainland China. In addition to providing numerous fixed-pricing products,
Taobao.com is also the most popular auction site among the aforementioned websites: all twenty-one of the
interviewees had used it.
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Content Analysis and Results
Taxonomy of Bidding Strategies
The research results of this study confirmed
the taxonomy of bidding strategies that was
identified in the review of the literature. We
confirmed that the interviewees adopted the
jump, ratchet, agent, snipe, and sip-and-dip
bidding strategies at least once when
bidding. Table 2 summarizes the results of
the content analysis of bidding strategies.
Meanwhile, we found a number of
significant findings that differed from
previous research. First, the “earlier
evaluators” found in Bapna et al. (2004) was
not considered a viable strategy in our
sample. Interviewees 2 and 20, respectively,
said that this strategy was “an ineffective

way” that “can only raise auction price
quickly.” We believe this inconsistency can
be explained by the fact that most of the
auctions in Taobao are single-item auctions
in which bidders do not have to get priorities
with early bids as do in Yankee auctions
(Bapna et al., 2004). Importantly, Bapna et
al. (2004) noted that evaluators have largely
moved from the early stage of auctions to
the middle stage, owing to the so-called
learning effect, which echoes the concerns
raised by our interviewees. In fact, some
interviewees (such as Interviewees 1, 9,
and 21) did recall that they had bid in this
manner when they were just starting out,
but abandoned the strategy when they
became more experienced and successful
in online bidding.

Table 2 - Summarized Results of Bidding Strategy Taxonomy
Bidding Strategy
Jump bidding
Ratchet bidding
Agent bidding
Snipe bidding
Sip-and-dip bidding

Results; Confirmed as per previous research but with new information
stemming from our research:











Usually does not occur in the early stage of bidding
May occur in the middle stage of multi-item auctions
Combined with agent bidding in some single-item auctions
Combined with snipe bidding to make the latter more effective
Confirmed as noted in previous research
Confirmed as noted in previous research
Occasionally combined with jump bidding to form “jump-agent” bidding
Confirmed as noted in previous research
Occasionally combined with snipe bidding to form “jump-snipe” bidding
Confirmed as noted in previous research

Second, we observed jump bidding in our
study. Jump bidding was shown in multi-unit
auctions as well as in single-unit auctions.
In multi-unit auctions, bidders can adopt
jump bidding directly, such as the case of
Interviewee 14, who bids at a higher price
than necessary to make a jump that can
send other bidders the signal that “I am
determined to obtain some of these items.”
This is usually done because the bidder
may not have to pay the price that he or she
submits (i.e., the final price of multi-item
auctions will be the lowest winning bid at the
end). The possible lower final price makes
the “jumping” behavior less risky, which
encourages some bidders to “jump” to send

their signals to the other bidders, mostly
during the middle stage of the auction.
This is usually done because the bidder
may not have to pay the price that he or she
submits (i.e., the final price of multi-item
auctions will be the lowest winning bid at the
end). The possible lower final price makes
the “jumping” behavior less risky, which
encourages some bidders to “jump” to send
their signals to the other bidders, mostly
during the middle stage of the auction.
Interestingly, a new form of “jump” is used in
single-unit auctions due to different bidding
systems. For instance, single-unit auctions
in Taobao.com will automatically trigger a
bidding agent when a bidder jumps
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unusually high (by several times the minimal
bid increment) over the current price. In this
case, the current price will not be raised to
the actual bid, but only by a minimal bid
increment until the other bidders respond.
The bidding agent automatically outbids the
other bidders until other bidders cease to
compete or the current price has been
gradually increased higher than the bidder’s
actual bid. This mechanism originally was
implemented on Taobao.com to protect
bidders from paying too much. Interviewee
2 described this new form of “jump” as “a
more effective method” than traditional
“jumps” in three ways: (1) it keeps the
previous signaling function from “jumping,”
because their bids will be marked with
“agent bids” in the bidding list when the
bidding agent is triggered; this will tell others
that “my will to get the item is strong”; (2)
the actual bids are concealed by bidding
systems and are hard to guess, which can
eventually frighten away other bidders; and
(3) the bidder who jumps may not have to
pay his or her reservation price if others
stop competing before the price is achieved,
which helps the winning bidder to gain some
consumer surplus (i.e., the amount a bidder
is said to be willing to pay more than the
amount the bidder actually pays). Because
the jump-bidding strategy in single-unit
auctions is combined with agent bidding, we
call it “jump-agent bidding.” In addition to
this combination of jump and agent bidding,
we likewise discovered a jump-snipe
bidding variant.
Although the interviewees deemed pure
snipe bidding to be an effective strategy, a
sniper may still face sniping from others.
When several bidders choose this strategy
in the same auction, only one person who is
skilled and lucky enough can snipe
successfully. He or she has to submit a bid
earlier than others to ensure the bid is
available, but late enough to keep others
from responding. If this happens, other
snipers may eventually lose the auctioned
item, even though they have waited for a
long time for it. In this case, bidders learn to
snipe with a higher submitted bid in order to

ensure that they can obtain the item. Here,
a higher bid will help defeat the others’
snipes even if the higher bid’s timing is not
optimal. This strategy does not aim to signal
to other bidders a strong will to win, but
rather the interesting twist “to beat other
snipers within a limited time.” The mixed
strategy not only allows bidders to outbid
their rival bidders with unexpected bids but
also leaves no chance for rivals to catch up
in time with the big jump. Therefore,
Interviewee 2 considers the mixed strategy
of snipe-jump “much more effective” than
standard sniping.
From our analysis, we can see that, with the
exception of jump bidding by early
evaluators, which our interviewees found to
be a poor strategy for winning, the basic
strategies discussed in the previous
literature were still validated as actual
strategies used by professional online
bidders. We also showed that some variants
or combinations of these bidding strategies
may appear. A reason for this new
phenomenon can be explained from the
strategies themselves, which are essentially
compatible; they are not independent or
exclusive from each other. Another reason
that triggered the variants or combinations
was determined by real bidding systems
provided by the different online auction
intermediaries. For instance, the emergence
of the jump-agent bidding in Taobao’s
single-unit auctions is determined by its
online bidding system. The true bidding
strategy selection of the bidders therefore
will be affected depending on how the
mechanism is designed in other online
auction systems.
Bidding Mechanisms
Technological service effectiveness was the
first factor among the environmental factors
that we investigated. When the interviewees
were asked about the effectiveness of the
bidding agent in online auction websites,
most perceived the agent as being
important to some extent. Among those who
adopted the agent bidding strategy, they
perceived that the bidding agent they used
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was effective. A respondent said that “it
cannot only help me to bid but also help me
to fulfill the motivation to save time.” Here,
the agent can automatically submit bids
step-by-step when bidders do not have time
to check auctions, or if they are offline. They
can submit bids in this way as if they were
consistently participating in the auctions, but
without spending as much time. In effect,
most bidders tend to adopt agent bidding
more if they feel that “the service functions
well.”
In addition to the bidding agent, another
technological service that the interviewees
favored is called “watch-the-item” (WTI, or
“favorite items” in some websites). Nearly
half of the respondents (10 out of 21
interviewees) considered it a “helpful
assistant” provided by auction sites to help
bidders track the auctions that they may
want to participate in later. The
effectiveness of this service enhances the
occurrence of snipe bidding because
bidders can now check their favorite
auctions at any time and snipe those
auctions that are coming to an end. The
effectiveness
of
auction-related
technologies therefore will persuade bidders
to adopt them and choose the related
bidding strategies.
The effectiveness of some technological
services, however, did not show such
influence on bidding strategies. On the one
hand, all interviewees noted the importance
of feedback mechanisms. They believed
that these mechanisms could help them to
evaluate the sellers and to make a decision
about whether or not to enter an auction. All
of the informants expressed the opinion that
this mechanism could not affect bidding
behavior once the entry decision had been
made. A search engine could help bidders
to set their own reservation prices, but it
likewise did not affect their bidding
strategies during the online bidding process.
This was also true for payment channels.
The interviewees considered escrow
services (or third party services, such as
payment or delivery) to be important in an

online exchange, although the services did
not generally influence bidding strategy.
Interviewee 1 said that she had to conduct a
face-to-face trade after the online bidding
because Yahoo.com.hk did not provide an
escrow service. Despite its effects on the
post-bidding trade format, the existence of
payment channels still had no effect on the
bidding behavior, according to the
experience of all twenty-one informants.
Another important environmental factor
confirmed by our study is the social
presence of other bidders. The number of
other bidders at the auction may also affect
bidding behavior, lead to a herding bias and
have a negative effect which implies higher
winner’s curse (Rafaeli & Noy, 2005). For
instance, eighteen out of the twenty-one
interviewees reported evidence of the
herding effect, although to varying degrees.
Some interviewees said that when there
were more bids showing in an auction, their
behavior may change and they might be
ready to pay more to obtain the item. Over
time, this behavior will increase their
reservation price, meaning that the final
price may also be raised accordingly. The
herding effect may also change their
motivations for bidding. Under this effect,
they are more motivated to win the bid and
obtain the item. One interviewee said, “Now
the important issue is not the price, but the
item.” Some interviewees (7, 13, 16, and 19)
even admitted that they had participated in
“price wars” with other bidders at least once.
These
interviewees
also
expressed
excitement in being involved in an auction in
which there were more bids, especially
when “there are one or more bidders who
always bid right after you.” Interviewee 7
said, “Fighting with them is fun and
exciting.” The emphasis in this situation
evidently is not on the item auctioned but in
the excitement of competition. Several
interviewees also described winning an
auction as a satisfying feeling of “defeating”
other rivals. The professional bidders also
adopted ratchet bidding, or “nibbling,” when
the herding effect occurred, because they
wanted to participate in the competition
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personally. In addition, according to social
influence theory (Latane; Rafaeli & Noy,
2005), individuals may treat others as
referents to compare behaviors, attitudes
and performance. Bidders present at an
auction are influenced by one another. They
may refer to the estimations of other bidders
to make accurate decisions because items
sold in auctions sometimes do not have a
definite market value. Thus, the presence of
other bidders could exert an influence on
the individual’s valuation and bidding
behavior.
The herding effect, however, was less
common in commodity auctions than in
collectible auctions. In commodity auctions,
bidders sometimes set a fixed reservation
price for the commodity. Some were more
cautious when there were more bids
showing up for a commodity because more
bids could increase the final price of the
auction (Du, Hom, Yu, Fang, & Wang, 2012).
In order to avoid the “winner’s curse”
(Easley, Wood, & Barkataki, 2011), in which
the winning bidder may pay more than the
object is worth, bidders either set a
reservation price to the bidding agent or
sniped at the end of the auction.
Because 13 interviewees said that bid
increments influenced their bidding behavior,
we found that bid increments may be
relevant to the bidding strategies adopted in
the auction environment. If the bid
increment in a given auction was large—for
instance, more than that of similar
auctions—they carefully followed the
auction by ratchet-bidding because of the
high risk brought about by a large bid
increment. They did this rather than jumping

to a high price despite the moderation of
bidding agents. When the bid increment
was small, on the other hand, bidders
tended to set a high price to the bidding
agent, and had it to compete for them.
The influence of the starting price on
bidding strategies remains unclear, because
most of the auctions the interviewees
participated in had a standard starting price
(for example, the “one-dollar-start-auction”
on Taobao.com). Most of the interviewees
were more concerned with the current price,
and they did not usually act during the early
period of an auction (except for early bids
for time priority in multi-unit auctions). They
also believed that if the starting price of an
auction was very low, others would raise it
through the natural course of bidding. In
contrast, when the starting price was too
high, the bidders often considered not
participating. The influence of the starting
price directly on the bidding strategy choice
therefore is not apparent.
One interviewee who participated in
Yahoo.com auctions, however, identified the
effect of ending rules as being important.
Yahoo.com is the only auction website that
provides two optional auction-ending rules
to sellers. The interviewee confirmed that
hard-close ending rules will definitely
enhance the chances of snipe bidding. The
effect of this environmental factor needs
further confirmation, however, because only
one interviewee reported this phenomenon.
We term this type of effect as a marginal
effect that was only observed by a few
interviewees. Table 3 summarizes the
results of the environmental factors.
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Table 3 - Summarized Results of Bidding Mechanisms
Bidding Mechanisms

Results

Effectiveness of bidding agent
Effectiveness of “watch-the-item” (WTI)
Effectiveness of escrow services
Effectiveness of feedback mechanisms
Effectiveness of search engines
















Herding effect

Bid increment
Starting price
Ending rules

Confirmed to have an effect on agent bidding
Discovered to have an effect on snipe bidding
Cannot be confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies
Cannot be confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies
Cannot be confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies
Confirmed as per previous research
Motivates bidders to obtain the item (collectibles)
Motivates bidders to adopt ratchet bidding
Has less effect in commodity auctions
Confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies
High bid increments will lead to ratchet bidding
Low bid increments will increase jump-agent bidding
Cannot be confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies
Marginally confirmed to have an effect on bidding strategies

Product Categories
The interviewees perceived that there were
a few differences between the auctions of
different
products,
particularly
for
collectibles and commodities. They also
proposed three dimensions to differentiate
this
classification:
attractiveness,
uniqueness, and availability. Bidders often
bid for collectibles because they are
attractive, unique, or are not easy to obtain
in the markets (or all three). Examples of
these are antiques or t-shirts of certain
celebrities. The interviewees mentioned that
they were highly motivated to obtain items
because of these three factors. They also
felt more excited when they won these
auctions and acquired the items. As a result,
they usually applied ratchet bidding to
evaluate the true value of the collectibles,
and snipe-jump bidding to obtain the items.
Nevertheless, bidders who bid mainly for
commodities, such as clothes or decorative

items, reported that those items were less
attractive or unique and were highly
available in online markets. They were
therefore more motivated to save money
than to obtain the actual items themselves.
Because of this, setting a low fixed
reservation price to the bidding agent, or
sniping at the end of certain auctions, are
the two main strategies used in this case. It
therefore appears that the type of product
involved in an auction strongly influences
both bidding motivations and strategies
used.
Interestingly, bidding for either brand-new or
second-hand products did not appear to
influence interviewees’ bidding motivations
or strategies. All of the interviewees
concurred that what really mattered was
whether the product was a commodity or a
collectible. It did not matter whether it was
new or used. Table 4 summarizes the
results for product categories.

Table 4 - Summarized Results of Product Categories
Product Categories
Commodities
Collectibles
New item
Used item

Results







Confirmed to be different from bidding on collectibles
Motivated bidders to save money, not to obtain the item
Confirmed to be different from bidding on commodities
Motivated bidders to obtain the items, followed by to save money
not observed to be different from bidding on used item
not observed to be different from bidding on new item
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Bidder Characteristics
Bidding experience was the first relevant
bidder characteristic we identified that
influences bidding strategy. In fact, eleven
out
of
twenty-one
interviewees
(Interviewees 1, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19,
20, and 21) directly reported the changes in
bidding strategy adoption while they
accumulated
experience.
Interestingly,
almost all of these interviewees used
ratchet bidding during the early stages in
their bidding careers. Interviewee 17’s
reason was that “it is enjoyable to bid by
myself.” The adoption of this strategy,
however, decreased with time. They
subsequently learned to bid either by
employing agents or by bidding near an
auction’s end, and they considered the
agent or snipe bidding as a “more mature or
effective method.” This phenomenon is
consistent with the research findings of
previous studies. For example, Ariely et al.
(2005) found that bidders use ratchet
bidding less as they gain experience. Bapna
et al. (2004) found that bidders gradually
learned to use bidding agents as this new
technology became available. Borle et al.
(2006) found that some experienced bidders
tend to bid late. All of these can be
explained by Rieskamp and Otto (2006)
strategy selection learning (SSL) theory,
which states that the strategy selection
process is based on reinforcement learning.
Six interviewees did not report changes as
they accumulated experience, however.
When the data were examined carefully, we
found that five of these six interviewees
started bidding by using bidding agents and
had not changed their methods since then.
The remaining sixth interviewees, who
reported no changes from ratchet bidding,
only
had
eleven
winning
bidding
experiences. We therefore surmise that this
respondent is still in the process of learning
and his experience may not have been
strong enough to cause changes in his
bidding strategy. In summary, we confirmed
the impact of bidding experience on the
bidders’ bidding strategies. The less
experience the bidders had, the more they

tended to enjoy the bidding process itself,
and the less they tended to select agent- or
snipe bidding as a bidding strategy.
In addition to bidding experience, we also
observed that the time a bidder had
available to be online had a strong influence
on bidding behavior. People naturally have
different time availabilities and thus different
bidding strategies. The interviewees who
claimed to be busy and had less time to
spend online usually adopted an agentbidding strategy. A total of 7 interviewees
reported that they did so because they did
not have enough time to follow auctions;
sometimes they could not even snipe an
auction since they were busy doing other
things. In contrast, some bidders (such as
Interviewees 7, 14, and 17) who said they
disliked agent bidding actually had high
online time availability. These research
findings confirm the conjecture of Bapna et
al. (2004) about the influence of time
availability on bidding strategies.
Bapna et al. (2004) also speculated that risk
preference is an important factor in bidding
behavior. We found it to have a marginal
effect on bidding strategies in this study,
however. Although risk preference had no
direct influence on bidding strategies,
bidders’ risk preferences did have some
influence on their reactions to other bidders.
Those who were inclined to be highly
stimulated by the other bidders’ competition
stated that they were “risk-seeking” or
“sometimes risk-seeking, sometimes riskaverse.” Those who were seldom affected
by others reported that they were “riskaverse.” In discussing this issue, some
interviewees reported another bidder
characteristic that may also contribute to
this effect: we label this characteristic as
“rationality” and found it to be related to the
herding effect. The more rational the bidder
was, the less he or she was affected by
other bidders, and vice versa. That is, the
least rational bidders were most likely to be
influenced by the herding effect. We
therefore established the bidders’ rationality
as a fourth bidder characteristic that has
influence on bidding strategy selection,
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albeit indirectly. Table 5 summarizes the
results of the bidder characteristics.
Table 5 - Summarized Results of Bidder Characteristics
Bidder Characteristics
Bidding experience
Time availability
Risk preference
Rationality

Results








Confirmed its effects on bidding motivations and bidding strategies
Less experience leads to hedonic motivation and ratchet bidding
More experience leads to snipe bidding or agent bidding
Confirmed its effects on bidding strategies
Less available time leads to agent bidding
Confirmed its effects on the herding effect and bidding strategies
Discovered to have an effect on the herding effect, then to bidding strategies

Motivational Effect
Motivations have long been found to
influences judgment and choice processes
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). All of the
interviewees clearly stated their motivations
in bidding. Overall, aiming at getting the
product with minimal cost (saving money
was called for short below) was the most
popular bidding motivation we found. All of
the interviewees explicitly expressed their
motivation to save money in online auctions,
which indicates its prominence in online
auctions. Snipe bidding was mostly reported
when bidders wanted to save money,
because they believed it could help them
avoid a price war by helping to keep the
current price as low as possible. Motivated
by saving money, bidders usually did not
adopt explicit jump bidding because it may
raise the final price quickly. Some bidders,
however, tended to use agent bidding by
submitting a reservation price to the agent
with behavior similar to that of jump-agent
bidding. The main purpose here was not to
“jump,” but rather to use the agent to control
his or her bids and to avoid irrational bidding
and thus save money. Interviewees also
reported using ratchet bidding, but its
preference among bidders with moneysaving motivations is not clear. Some
interviewees, however, still reported that
saving time influences their bidding
strategies. They believed that agent- and
snipe bidding saved time because bidders
did not have to sit through the entire
process of an auction.

The second popular bidding motivation was
the acquisition of the item being auctioned.
This usually happened when an item, often
a collectible, was unique or difficult to
purchase on the market. In this case,
interviewees adopted the snipe-jump
strategy as the most effective way to win
auctions and to obtain the items. This
occurred particularly in highly competitive
auctions.
The third motivation was the hedonic
motivation of online bidding—the enjoyment
of the experience for its own sake. Most
respondents thought that the online bidding
process was enjoyable, especially when
they were just learning how to bid. At this
point in their learning, they would bid
continuously by themselves, because they
felt that ratchet bidding was enjoyable; this
enthusiasm tended to wane over time,
however. Some bidders who enjoyed the
bidding process simply chose ratchet
bidding for fun. In addition, some bidders
mentioned the excitement that sniping
brought to the end of an auction.
The online bidding motivation results are
summarized in Table 6, in which
interviewees confirmed that saving money,
obtaining an item, and enjoying the auction
process each were highly influential on
bidding strategies, while saving time was
only marginally influential. We did not
observe any other bidding motivations.
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Table 6 - Summarized Results of Online Bidding Motivations
Bidding Motivations
Money-savings
Item-owning

Hedonic motivation
Time-savings

Results











Confirmed as the most popular motivation for bidding
Leads most often to snipe bidding, followed by agent- and ratchet bidding
Confirmed as the second-most popular motivation for bidding
Usually occurs in auctions for collectibles
Leads most often to snipe-jump bidding
Confirmed as the third-most popular motivation for bidding
Especially popular when bidders are learning to bid
Leads most often to ratchet bidding, followed by snipe bidding
Marginally confirmed as a motivation in online auctions
Leads most often to agent bidding, followed by snipe bidding

Discussion and Future
Directions
Consistent with the contingency framework
proposed in Figure 1, all data collected in
the interview can be classified into the five
parts in the framework. Moreover, our study
examined the specific factors within the
framework and identified the antecedents of
online bidding strategy adoption. First, we
partially confirmed basic bidding strategies
in the extant literature, and saw the
appearance of some new or variant bidding
strategies. Second, we found that the
effectiveness of bidding agents and WTI
functions, the herding effect, auction bid
increments, and ending rules all had a direct
effect (an effect that was confirmed by the
majority of the interviewees) on the bidding

strategies. Third, bidding for commodities or
collectibles will generate different bidding
motivations and strategies in online auctions.
Fourth, we found that experience in the
bidding process directly impacts bidding
strategies. Time availability is highly related
to the adoption of the agent bidding strategy,
whereas we found that risk preference and
rationality influenced the herding effect.
Finally, interviewees reported that the
motivations to save money, to obtain an
item, to enjoy oneself, and to save time
were the direct drivers of online bidding
strategies. The confirmed results are
summarized in Table 7. Based on these
results, Figure 2 depicts the confirmed
research model that we propose for
research and practice going forward.

Table 7 - Summarized Results of the Antecedents of Major Online Bidding Strategies
Strategy
conditions

Ratchet bidding

Agent bidding

Jump-agent
bidding

Bidding
mechanisms

Herd effect (+)
Bid increment (+)

Effectiveness of
bidding agent (+)

Bid increment (-)

Product
categories

NA

NA

Collectibles through
item-owning
motivation (+)

Effectiveness of “WTI”
(+)
Hard-close (+)
Commodities though
money-saving motivation
(+)

Bidding experience
(+)
Time availability (-)

NA

Bidding experience (+)

Time-saving (+)

Item-owning (+)

Money-saving (+)
Hedonic motivation (+)
Time-saving (+)

Bidding experience (-)
Risk taking through
Bidder
herd effect (+)
characteristics
Rationality through
herd effect (-)
Money-saving (-)
Bidding
Hedonic motivation
motivations
(+)
(+): Positive related
(-): Negative related

Snipe bidding
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Figure 2 - Our Proposed Research Model of the Key Antecedents that Drive the Major
Online Bidding Strategies
The significant contributions of this study
was developing a contingency model of the
online bidding strategies with environmental
factors,
bidding
tasks,
bidders’
characteristics,
and
bidders’
bidding
motivations as the antecedents. This
research is a pioneering effort in the
comprehensive study of the antecedents of
online bidding strategies. We have
introduced the contingency theory to online
auction
research
and
incorporated

motivations, both for the first time. We
believe that the theoretical exploration in
this study will assist in the solid
development of online auction research.
The research model of online bidding
strategies explored in this study also
provides researchers with a clear picture of
the underlying reasons for the online
bidders’
heterogeneity.
We
likewise
anticipate that the enriched knowledge will
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help researchers to advance the research in
this area.
First, this study found that online bidding
strategies are highly affected by online
bidding systems provided by different
auction sites. For instance, Taobao.com
provides a novel yet user-friendly “bidding
agent” that can be triggered automatically
when the bid is unusually high. This bidding
agent not only gained a high reputation
among bidders, it also generated a new
bidding strategy, known as “jump-agent”
bidding. In addition, the effectiveness of
technological services is also highly related
to their adoption, which influences the entire
world of online bidding. Future studies
therefore can be conducted to design new
online bidding tools to attract more bidders.
Increasing the technological services will
help website owners to leverage the
information technology usage in online
auctions. We expect to see more agent
bidding, or hybrid bidding strategies that
includes agent bidding, in the future.
Second, the interviews showed that the
most popular bidding motivation in online
auctions is to save money, followed by the
motivation to own items and hedonic
motivation. Auction website owners may
refer to this order of motivations when
designing a new system or developing
technological services to meet consumers’
needs more effectively. Future researchers
can also further investigate the relationship
between these bidding motivations and
bidding strategies, this time with large
sample-size survey methods to generalize
the research findings in this study.
Third, this study showed that commodity
auctions and collectible auctions bring
different motivations for bidders that will
eventually affect their bidding strategies.
Websites
should
therefore
consider
developing two different bidding systems for
these two kinds of bidding sectors. The
segmentation of the products will enhance
the efficiency of searching, comparing, and
bidding. Future researchers can conduct
rigorous research to determine the

relationship of the biding strategies and the
“winner’s curse” of different products. The
consumer surplus of these two different
products can also be further examined.
Lastly, the results pertaining to bidder
characteristics may provide practitioners
with insights for their customized service.
This can enable different services to be
provided for different bidders based on their
different characteristics. For example,
different promotions are offered to bidders
with different levels of experience.
Inexperienced bidders can be encouraged
to use bidding agents more often. Those
who are busy, with a low level of time
availability, can be provided with more
efficient ways to bid. Risky products (such
as loans) will be promoted more to risktaking bidders rather than to risk-averse
bidders. The research findings can help the
owners of auction websites to increase their
user satisfaction.
Despite these contributions, this research
remains an exploratory study. Further
investigations are necessary on online
bidding strategy research. Our respondents
were professional online bidders in China;
thus, it is possible that cultural factors may
have influenced the results. This could be
especially true in terms of bidders’
motivations and decision-making strategies,
as substantial systems research shows that
cultural
differences
can
influence
motivations
and
decision-making
in
systems-use
contexts
involving
interpersonal interaction (Lowry, Cao, &
Everard, 2011; Lowry, Zhang, Zhou, & Fu,
2010; Posey, Lowry, Roberts, & Ellis, 2010).
Little is known if culture actually matters in
online bidding decisions. Future research
therefore needs to further confirm and build
on our model in other cultural settings, such
as in the United States and Europe. Due to
the sampling frame and small sample size,
that majority of interviewees had only
participated in the TaoBao platform.
Consequently, we could not to explore
differences between different transaction
platforms such as TaoBao, eBay, and
Amazon. Future research should be
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conducted to examine if the differences
among these platforms would impact
consumers’ bidding strategies. Some
marginal effects that cannot be confirmed
entirely in this study would still require
additional
investigations.
Finally,
measurements for each specific factor
should be developed; we suggest a survey
to collect mass data for statistical analysis
as a triangulation to enrich and cross-check
the data collected.
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Appendix: Interview Guide
Note: This interview guide was designed to
assist
the
interviewer.
Follow-up
discussions were added during the actual
interviews. The sequence of the questions
may not have been the same during the
interviews due to different responses by the
interviewees.
1.

3.

Bidding motivations:


Are you motivated to save money
when bidding?



Are you motivated to save time
when bidding?



Are you motivated to obtain the item
auctioned when bidding?

Background information:


What websites do you usually bid in?





Why do you choose auctions to buy
things?

Are you motivated to enjoy the
bidding process?





How many auctions have you won?

Do you have any other bidding
motivations?



For each kind of bidding motivation,
what kind of bidding strategy have
you applied? Do you think your
bidding motivation will affect your
bidding strategy selection?

2.

Bidding strategy:


Jump bidding—Have you ever
raised the price to a high level, even
though it was not necessary
according to the bid increment?



Ratchet bidding—Have you ever
followed an auction and increased
bids by the minimal bid increment?



Agent bidding—Have you ever
assigned a bidding agent to bid for
you?

4.

Bidding mechanism:


Do you think the bidding agent(s)
used by the auction site(s) is (are)
affective? Does its effectiveness
affect your bidding motivation or
bidding strategy?



Does the effectiveness of the
feedback mechanism affect your
bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?



Does the effectiveness of the escrow
service
affect
your
bidding
motivation or bidding strategy?



Does the effectiveness of the search
engine affect your bidding motivation
or bidding strategy?

**************************************************



This research aims to investigate the
antecedents of online bidding strategies.
Please recall the situations in selecting
different bidding strategies and the reason
why you adopted the bidding strategy in the
following parts.

Are you affected by the other
bidders’ bids? Does that influence
your bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?



Does the starting price affect your
bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?



Does the bid increment affect your
bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?



Snipe bidding—Have you ever just
waited and only bid near the end of
an auction?



Sip-and-dipping—Have you ever bid
for the first time at the early stage
and then bid for a second time near
the end of a multi-unit auction?



Are there any other bidding
strategies that you have used?
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5.

Do the ending rules affect your
bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?

6.

Are there other environmental
factors that will affect your bidding
motivation or bidding strategy?

Personal characteristics:


Do
you
think
your
bidding
experience will affect your bidding
strategy adoption?



Is time very valuable for you or do
you have much leisure time online?
Do you think this will affect your
bidding strategy?



Are you are a risk-averse or riskseeking person? Do you think this
will affect your bidding strategy?



Are
there
other
personal
characteristics that will affect your
bidding motivation or bidding
strategy?

Product categories:


Is there any difference in your
bidding motivation or your bidding
strategy when you bid for new items
or second-hand items?



Is there any difference in your
bidding motivation or your bidding
strategy when you bid for collectibles
or merchandise?



Are there other different auctions
that may affect your bidding
motivation or bidding strategy?

7.

Concluding questions:


It seems there are a lot of factors
that may influence bidding strategies.
Besides those we have discussed,
are there any other important things
we have missed?
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